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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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COUNTRY	USSR/East Germany	REPORT	
SUBJECT	Military Indications of the Imminence of Hostilities	DATE DISTR.	16 March 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	15
DATE OF INFO.		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES	50X1-HUM

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THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
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This study summarizes indications of military preparations for war which the Soviets may possibly take in Central Europe, and specifically the Soviet Zone of Germany.

It should be noted that a sound judgment of the seriousness of war preparations can only be given on the basis of information produced by all available sources with the widest possible scope. Many of the preparations specified may, but most not necessarily, be taken. Many a measure may be taken in an effort to practice threats or to increase the preparedness for defense without actual offensive intentions. Soviet fears of aggression, unwarranted as they may seem, can also release actions which may alarm the western intelligence services. It would, therefore, be dangerous to use this undoubtedly incomplete summary of indications as a catalogue with which to determine the moment at which preparations would transgress the critical mark. This summary is rather meant only to facilitate evaluations. It discusses both long-term and short-term preparations in the various fields of intelligence which include those of the Soviet Army, Airforce and Navy, the Volkspolizei, and the fields of transportation and supply.

A. The Soviet Army

I. Long-term preparations

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1. Arrival of infantry reinforcements.

The GOFG has a sufficient number of mechanized forces to conduct a long-range offensive operation with a fair chance of success. The available four rifle divisions are, however, not strong enough to force and penetrate the Rhine defense on a large front and to cover the deep flanks of armored spearheads. Since Polish forces and Volkspolizei in Eastern Germany would probably only be used to guard coastal areas and communication zones, all attack echelons would have to consist

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of Soviet personnel, thus requiring the GOFG to be reinforced by between 8 and 12 rifle divisions. This reinforcement may be effected either by movement to the Soviet Zone of Germany prior to the beginning of attack; by assembly in the area east of, and close to, the Oder-Neisse line; or by fluid and large movement from the USSR to the theater of operations coincident with, or shortly prior to, the beginning of the attack. It is believed that the threat of harassing air opposition as well as the strain on the transportation system resulting from the shipment of supplies will lead the Soviets, who are eager to avoid any major risks, to transport to the Soviet Zone of Germany at least four rifle divisions prior to the beginning of attack.

2. Arrival of army artillery (CEG Arty) reinforcements.

GOFG has available army artillery in the strength of two artillery divisions of different structure (high-angle fire and flat fire) which, although strong enough to support one attacking group, are too weak and of too unfavorable a structure to permit the formation of two or more large attack groups against the west, e.g. the Ruhr area and the middle Rhine. Since the First White Russian Front, now GOFG, attacked Berlin across the Oder River with seven artillery divisions and one rocket launcher division in World War II, it is probable that at least two artillery divisions may be made available as reinforcements prior to the beginning of attack. They may either arrive as compact units, or be assembled in Germany from personnel and materiel arriving successively.

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3. Establishment of Supply bases close to the border.

Supply depots above division level are now usually located in a rear area more than 100 km. from the areas which are likely to serve as areas of strategic concentration. Since, for example, mechanized armies moving by road would have consumed almost one refill on arrival at these concentration areas, the Soviets may see fit to establish ammunition depots and fuel dumps close to the zonal border prior to the beginning of attack to avoid long supply routes exposed to air attack. These depots may either be established under cover during a long period of time, or be prepared for short-term establishment by making mobile some of the depots now serving armies and groups.

4. Reinforcements of personnel.

As a result of the exchange of personnel which took place in the fall, the units of the GOFG attained an actual strength which is only about 10 percent below war strength. These 10 percent are frequently made up by whole units, e.g. the third motorized rifle battalions of mechanized regiments. Although it is believed that an attack operation could be started prior to filling up to war strength, there is reason for believing that additional personnel of about 40,000 soldiers may be made available. If this contingent consisted of trained soldiers, rather than recruits, it would immediately increase the preparedness for war and thus be an indication of alarm.

5. Intensified Soviet border control.

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The Soviets intensified their border control in conjunction with the restrictive measures imposed in May 1952. It is believed that under some pretext they will seal off their concentration areas prior to a planned attack by employment of additional patrols and closing-down of border crossing points.

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6. Overhauling of vehicles and arms.

Since all units will be required to keep their equipment in full readiness for combat, the increase of maintaining of arms and equipment during a period of from two to three weeks prior to the attack is to be expected. A limitation or even prohibition of small-scale exercises, drivers' practice and formation drill may therefore be imposed. Giving preference to the moment of surprise over the readiness of materiel, the army group headquarters may avoid earlier orientation, thus limiting the maintenance period to two or three days.

7. Ban on leaves.

Since the permanent quota of leaves is only 2 percent of unit strength, there is the possibility that for reasons of camouflage, no ban on leaves may be imposed during the period of preparation for war and that only after announcement of imminent action at division level may a cancellation of leaves and restriction to quarters take place.

8. Requisition of trucks.

It is believed that, even after completion of the large 1952 exchange program, the number of trucks available to the supply troops of the GDRG is inadequate for supply movements of several large echelons. It is therefore, likely that trucks may be requisitioned in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Although this action may start only shortly before, or even after, the beginning of attack, it probably requires new preparations for registration, possibly over a protracted period of time.

9. Storing of emergency bridge construction material.

Since the Soviets have to expect that after the beginning of attack vital bridges in the communications zone will be destroyed by enemy air operation, they are likely to make available bridge construction material, for example at the Elbe River and Oder River bridges, possibly a long time before the beginning of hostilities. They may pile up wooden and iron girders and also assemble barges designed to serve as floating supports.

III. Short-Term Preparations

1. Advance of mechanized armies.

Since in the event of aggression no compact defense front is to be expected on the eastern border of Western Germany and since the Soviet high command will be interested in rapid gain of terrain, the four mechanized armies of the GDRG will probably be employed as attack columns, thus requiring the mechanized armies stationed east of the Elbe-Saale line to move up to the zonal border shortly before the beginning of attack, i.e. during the last three to four nights. Tracked vehicles will probably also move by road to ease the strain on the railroad net, and should thus be recognized at the Elbe River. The advance of these mechanized armies may, of course, be camouflaged as a training movement made for training purposes without, however, losing its dangerous character.

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2. AAA protection at defiles and traffic centers.

It is believed that shortly before the beginning of attack additional AAA protection will be established at defiles, e.g. the Elbe River bridges, vital railroad stations and in the areas of concentration. While the guns may possibly be emplaced only during the night of attack, preparations such as excavations, shipments of ammunition and construction of cables may possibly become apparent earlier.

3. Radio restrictions.

Radio stations of headquarters of the group, armies and divisions, along with the tactical headquarters will move to the border in the event of concentration. Since the Soviets know that training traffic can be monitored and located, there is reason for believing that they will conceal these movements by either imposing complete radio silence, or by having stations transmit deception messages.

4. Familiarization with, and marking of, terrain in the border area.

Since the Soviet High Command places special emphasis on the familiarization of all unit commanders with terrain features, it is to be expected that tactical rides and walks will be made in the areas of concentration, and that specific points will be marked. However, if the units involved have been trained for months and are prepared by exercises for their specific missions in the concentration area, these measures may not be taken for security reasons.

5. Establishment of additional signal communication in the border area.

Since security considerations will not permit tactical radio traffic prior to the beginning of attack, a concentration of more than 20 divisions in the area of the zonal border will require establishment of additional signal communications, e.g. additional telephone lines, which may be recognized as they cannot possibly be constructed in a few hours. Preparations for employment of civilian exchanges may also become apparent.

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6.**7. Issuance of additional items of equipment.**

It is believed that the multi-colored epaulets which belong to the dress uniforms and are now worn by the Soviet soldiers on field uniforms will be replaced by khaki shoulder straps shortly before the beginning of attack. It is also to be expected that gas protective equipment, emergency rations and personal issues of ammunition will be issued to the troops.

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8. Assembly of units in the border area.

Assembly and concentration in the border area of a large number of attack groups will require movements and concentration of columns, establishment of protective artillery positions and tent camps and construction of trench shelters which cannot be concealed. Since the Soviet High Command will of course make every effort to keep as short as possible the critical period of time during which the attack groups concentrate, it is conceivable that, on the basis of carefully coordinated mobilization plans, the entire concentration movement may be made from the home stations in little more than 48 hours prior to the planned crossing of the border.

B. Volkspolizei

None of the military VP units is or can be made ready for employment at short notice, e.g. within a period of two weeks. It is also improbable that a VP force ready for immediate employment could be organized from the best trained and politically most reliable VP personnel detached from existing units. Although possible, this procedure would seriously endanger the efficiency and status of the VP units involved. It is therefore rather safe to assume that the military Volkspolizei will not be ready for limited military employment within the framework of Soviet military forces before the summer of 1953 at the earliest.

Employment of military VP units as front-line troops is hardly probable even after this date; these units may rather be assigned the mission of guarding areas conquered by the Red Army and protecting supply lines. As this does not require military VP units to become mobilized before the outbreak of hostilities, it may be inferred that the mobilization of military VP units will probably be determined later than that of the Soviet troops.

On the other hand, there is the possibility that the VP may be given the role of starting a conflict, either by making operations against West Berlin or by provoking border violations and that, therefore, military VP units may be moved to new stations prior to aggressive operations by the Soviets. Since VP operations of this type are possible at any time in connection with the Cold War, it is of the utmost importance quickly and accurately to evaluate and determine whether they are Cold War measures or a prelude to actual war.

Indications of an imminent armed conflict may be the placing of the border police on a stand-by status, the closing of zonal boundaries, the sealing off of Berlin with the help of military VP units, the movement of the latter units to the area west of the Elbe River, increased control of major roads, railroad lines, bridges and rail junctions, cancellation of all leaves for the VP and their restriction to quarters, continuous employment of the so-called Voluntary Helpers of the VP as well as sudden requisition of motor vehicles for the VP. Definite conclusions can, of course, only be drawn on the basis of the over-all picture.

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C. Soviet Air Force

Three Soviet air armies in addition to major elements of the air army of the Baltic Fleet are in a position to provide support to attacking ground forces. These are the Twenty-Fourth Air Army stationed in the Soviet Zone of Germany, the Fourth Air Army stationed in Poland, and the Fifty-Ninth Air Army stationed in Austria and Hungary. Since the Twenty-Fourth Air Army is the best covered army and is of particular importance because of its location, there is reason for believing that the first indications of imminent Soviet attack will be measures taken in the area of this army. Pertinent data which have already been mentioned in Section A (army) of this study will be omitted in the following paragraphs.

I. Long-term preparations.

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1. Measures taken to bring units up to authorized equipment strength

While the ground attack units of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army are fully equipped with IL-10 operational aircraft, the average fighter regiment has at present only 25 MIG-15s as against 40 provided for by the T/E. Of the two bomber divisions stationed in the Soviet Zone of Germany, only one has been reequipped with IL-28 type light jet bombers with each of the regiments of this division having only 18 to 20 IL-28s as against an authorized strength of 39 such planes.

Since it appears improbable that the Soviets should start a surprise attack without bringing the fighter and bomber units of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army up to authorized strength, the aircraft required for that purpose may either be flown to Germany on short notice or, in the event of careful preparation for aggression, may be shipped to Germany by rail as was previously observed with MIG-15s. The shipping of these aircraft and their assembly will require at least three or four weeks.

Soviet procedures observed so far tended to indicate that the IL-28s required for the reequipment of bomber divisions will not be flown to Germany immediately before attack.

Accelerated reequipment of bomber divisions with jet bombers and the speeding up of measures designed to bring reequipped bomber divisions and fighter units up to T/E strength is considered a serious warning of imminent aggressive operations.

2. Movement of units.

Unlike army units, the units of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army in Germany and of the Fifty-Ninth Air Army in Austria/Hungary will not have to effect major movements prior to the beginning of an attack. It is believed, however, that prior to attack the units of the Fourth Air Army will be moved either to Germany, or more probably, to Western Czechoslovakia where the Soviets would have to prepare airfields for the reception of operational air units and make available the required supplies and material.

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3. Preparations made at unoccupied airfields for the reception of operational units.

The Soviets maintain a number of unoccupied airfields in Germany which are serviceable at any time. They also have a number of new airfields under construction and are enlarging other fields. In the event of war, these fields may be used as alternate fields by units of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army or will be occupied by units, which arrive and may include air transport units. Prior to an intended attack, they may, however, also be prepared by the Soviets for occupation by operational units. While the shipping to these fields of ammunition and fuel, the reconditioning of landing fields, the construction of approach roads and aircraft dispersal areas are long-term preparations, advance details charged with the last preparations for the reception of an air unit may arrive only a few days in advance of their air units. Unusual acceleration of construction work at airfields nearing completion reflected in a transfer of labor and construction machinery from construction projects not vital for the war effort also is an indication of imminent war.

4. Improvement of the aircraft warning service.

In addition to the existing radar net, aircraft observation guards will have to be employed to spot enemy air units flying at low altitudes. While preparations for the establishment of an aircraft warning net require considerable time, the occupation of anti-aircraft lookouts and the activation of communication nets may be ordered at short notice.

5. Organization of motorized airfield construction and maintenance units.

Since the Soviets must expect the jump-off fields of their air units will be attacked by enemy bomber units, they will probably organize motorized construction units equipped with heavy construction machinery and pertinent material in order to be able to quickly repair damage, particularly on runways and taxiways.

6. Transfer of training units to rear areas.

In the event of war, the training of VP air units in Germany will be a burden for the Soviets. Difficulties in the fuel supply might arise and the VP airfields would be required by Soviet units. Since all transportation facilities will be required by the Soviets and, moreover, will be exposed to many dangers, VP air units will probably be moved to places outside the zone prior to the beginning of large-scale transportation operations necessitated by the war effort.

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II. Short-term preparations.

1. Last measures for the conversion of occupied airfields to wartime status.

Although the Soviets strive to have their air units and jump-off bases ready for immediate employment and make it their policy to take measures normally carried out only in the stage of active war preparations as much beforehand as possible, there will be a number of short-term preparations indicative of the imminence of aggressive operations. These indications include a marked acceleration in the construction of aircraft revetments; preparation of camouflage measures against enemy air attacks; stocking up of supply dumps; tightening of security measures; return to the USSR of dependents; increased maintenance activities during periods of reduced flying activity; storage of ammunition and bombs in the vicinity of aircraft revetments; and increased AAA protection.

2. Enlargement of aircraft maintenance facilities.

Since aircraft maintenance which is now conducted along peace time lines within the Twenty-Fourth Air Army will not be adequate for the increased demands of war, the capacity of available maintenance installations may be enhanced by either assignment of additional personnel to repair bases of the air armies, or assignment of mobile aircraft maintenance shops.

3. Preparations for the transfer of high-ranking headquarters.

As the Soviets will presumably expect enemy air attacks against the present locations of their air armies and corps, they will probably prepare and move to alternate headquarters not later than the beginning of war operations.

4. Joint conferences of army and air force headquarters.

Because of the close cooperation between Soviet Air Force and Army units, preparations for aggressive operations may also be reflected in increased traffic between army and air force headquarters, particularly headquarters of ground attack and air reconnaissance units. Army officers will participate in command post exercises of air force units and vice versa.

D. Navy

Contrary to conditions prevailing in the Army and Air Force, naval forces are permanently kept in a status making it possible to ready them for action at short notice. The measures required for this purpose will, therefore, not be so conspicuous as the mobilization of ground and air forces.

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I. Long-term preparations.

1. Naval forces.

Prior to an outbreak of hostilities, heavy units of the Soviet naval forces will probably return to their home ports to establish full readiness for action, and therefore, may break off exercises, giving pertinent orders only at short notice for reasons of security. On the other hand, Soviet vessels seemingly engaged in exercises while actually ready for action may be moved to assembly areas and jump-off ports, thus requiring an increase of complements from peace time strength to war time strength and the maintaining of this strength over a prolonged period of time during which preparations may become palpable.

2. Supplies.

The increased requirements for fuels such as coal and oil and for construction materials such as mild steel and shipbuilding plates, which have to be met at the outbreak of hostilities, necessitate a replenishing of depots beyond the usual level. Ships with supplies for advanced bases of operations will also probably be sent from the USSR to Germany at an increased rate and, possibly, stay in port without discharging their loads.

3. Acceleration of activities at shipyards.

Prior to an intended attack, work at shipyards will be accelerated, involving an increase of labor forces and the number of shifts worked. Security measures will be tightened, and air defense and blackout measures will be taken. New floating docks may be assigned to shipyards, thus requiring corresponding dredging operations.

4. Air defense.

Air defense measures will be taken and the existing protection will be increased in times of acute tension. Air defense installations will be tested and put in operation.

5. Merchant Marine.

Soviet merchant ships will no longer be sent abroad in periods of tension. Ships at sea will be called back to avoid calling at neutral ports and ships under repair in foreign ports will be given target dates for completion of repair and orders for return.

6. Inland navigation.

The imminence of hostilities will also affect inland shipping. It will be reflected in increased traffic of goods required for the armament industry, the assembly of shipping space obviously not needed for commercial operations and in the preparations of vessels, particularly motor barges, for landing operations.

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II. Short-term preparations.

1. Naval forces.

It is believed that only light units of the Soviet Navy will be stationed in German ports prior to hostilities and that heavy units will probably be in Soviet ports. The naval forces stationed in Germany will be readied for action; the German Sea Police will increase operations and possibly frequently cooperate with Soviet units. (Change of flags). There will also be an increase in patrol activities before ports.

2. Arrival of landing forces.

Since surprise landing operations by the Soviets in southern Scandinavia are well possible, landing units and supporting forces may be moved in convoys through the western portion of the Baltic Sea immediately prior to aggression.

3. Laying of mine fields.

The Soviets will probably try to lay mine fields prior to the outbreak of hostilities to protect their naval bases. Barrage control will probably be ordered for areas in the vicinity of ports.

4. Measures affecting navigation aids.

Changes in the set-up of lights and sea-marks, blackout measures affecting navigational aids, the setting up of new landmarks (buoys) and compulsory pilotage are rather safe indications of port protection measures usually undertaken in periods of severe tension.

5. Requisitioning of merchant ships.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, a sizable number of merchant ships will be requisitioned for military use and be fitted out at shipyards, receiving blackout facilities, camouflage paint, and guns in addition to more powerful radio equipment.

6. Treatment of foreign merchant ships.

Prior to starting aggressive operations, the Soviets will probably make it difficult or impossible for foreign merchant ships to leave port, using a variety of pretexts, e.g. a quarantine, a marine accident blocking the fairway or the issuance of new passport regulations. They will also tighten security measures to prevent sabotage acts.

7. Fishing.

Restrictions will be imposed on fishing which may even be suspended altogether. A sizable number of fishing boats will certainly be confiscated and be made available for military use. Crews of fishing vessels and fishermen will be subjected to compulsory service.

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8. Inland navigation in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

Commercial traffic will be restricted and all shipments will probably be subjected to military control to prevent sabotage acts designed to block navigable channels. Special teams jointly operating with tugs, cranes and dredges may be formed to eliminate hindrances to inland navigation. Material dumps for repair of canals, bridges locks and other man-made structures will probably also be established.

E. Transportation and Supply.

For every aggressive operation, no matter whether based on short-term or long-term operations, the Soviet occupation forces must rely on the East German railroad system, its installations, equipment and trained personnel, because they would not be in a position to run the German railroad system with Soviet personnel. The consequence of this dependence is that preparations for an aggressive operation would be more conspicuous in this field than in any other sector, no matter how careful the Soviets may be in concealing their intentions.

The execution of the strategic and operational measures mentioned in Sections A (army) and C (air force) will be reflected, in the field of transportation and supply, in a series of activities which are separately listed below. Although they in themselves may not be conclusive evidence, their ensemble will provide a safe indication of an intended aggressive operation.

I. Transportation.IndicationsCommentShort-term preparations

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| 1. Dismantling of sideboards from a sizeable number of gondola cars | The number of flatcars available is not adequate for large-scale transportation operations. However, there is no shortage of gondola cars, which represent almost 50 percent of the total park of freight cars. After the dismantling of sideboards, gondola cars could be used as flatcars. |
| 2. Conversion of sizable numbers of boxcars for troop movements | Boxcars fitted with benches, stoves, and arms racks are used for the movement of troops. |
| 3. Assembly of heavy-duty flatcars in the quartering areas of the mechanized armies stationed in the Zone. | There is a possibility that tracked vehicles of the mechanized armies will be shipped by rail, when these armies are moved closer to the zonal boundary. |
| 4. Dispatch of numerous railroad tank cars to hydrogenation plants or the large Soviet fuel depots. | |

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| 5. Unusual movement of freight cars, either within the Zone or to the East | Empty trains required for the loading of troops would have to be dispatched to places in the Zone or to the USSR and her Satellites. |
| 6. Formation of military trains, so-called standard type trains, required for troop movements. | A specific composition of trains furnishes indications as to the units to be moved; e.g. converted boxcars and flatcars are used for motorized troops; converted boxcars and heavy-duty flatcars for armored troops; converted boxcars, boxcars and flatcars for horse-drawn units. |
| 7. Reduction or suspension of civilian passenger traffic; reduction of the freight space allocated to the Soviet Zone economy; the fixing of target dates for seasonal shipments. | Large-scale military transportation operations will necessitate a noticeable reduction of civilian traffic.
X |
| 8. Measures to make parked reserve locomotives ready for employment. | These measures will affect the Soviet locomotive column reserves, and the reserve locomotives of the Directorate General, Railroads, and of the regional railroad headquarters. |
| 9. Attachment of an increased number of Soviet transportation officers to Soviet Zone railroad agencies. | |
| 10. The observation of Soviet railroad transportation officers at stations in the western portion of the Soviet Zone of Germany. | Such RTOs will have to prepare deloading points for troops and supply. |
| 11. Intensive traffic of couriers, special mission staff officers and liaison officers at Soviet transportation headquarters attached to German railroad agencies. | Briefing of advance details of units to be entrained or detrained. |
| 12. Cancelling of all leaves, establishment of round-the-clock duty hours, issuance of orders to have railroad offices occupied day and night. | |
| 13. Increased activities at the main department "Traffic and Operation" of the Soviet Zone Directorate General, Railroads, and abrupt increase of teletype and telephone operations. | The traffic and operations department will be the department most affected by large-scale military traffic operations. |
| 14. The formation of teams of railroadmen for employment outside the Zone. | Such teams will be required for railroad operations and control purposes in the areas conquered by the Soviet troops. |
| 15. Assembly of mobile ramps and loading bridges | This equipment will be needed for the entraining or detraining of vehicles at points where no stationary loading ramps are available |

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IndicationsComment

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| 16. | Air raid precautionary measures | Installation of black-out devices; construction of air raid trenches at railroad stations; preparations for, or establishment of, AAA emplacements near major bridges. |
| 17. | Distribution of sealed envelopes which may be opened only on transmission of a specific code message. | The letters contain mobilization orders in the field of railroad operations. |
| 18. | Assignment of guards or increase of guard personnel charged with the guarding of important railroad installations such as bridges, viaducts, tunnels and power stations. | Volkspolizei transportation police or Soviet soldiers may be involved. |
| 19. | Assembly of sizable quantities of material required for loading purposes, such as wooden wedges, nails, ropes, etc. | This material will be required for the fastening of vehicles on flatcars. Previous observations indicated that the material is furnished by the Soviet Zone railroad administration. |
| 20. | Preparations taken by units to be entrained; arrival of advance details at the assigned entraining points. | Such advance details are bound to be sent by units of mechanized armies and may be expected to arrive only a few hours prior to the beginning of entraining operations. |

Long-term preparations

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| 21. | Increase of coal stocks above 14 days' requirements. | Coal shipments will increase and large amounts of hard coal imported from Upper Silesia will pass through Soviet Zone border crossing points. |
| 22. | Considerable increase of border crossing traffic. | Troops and supplies will arrive in Germany from the USSR and the satellite countries. |
| 23. | Utilization of the Forst and Horke railroad stations, on the Oder-Neisse line, stations which normally not used by the Soviets. | The increased volume of Soviet transit traffic through Poland will require the utilization or additional railroad lines. |
| 24. | Reconstruction of destroyed railroad bridges on the Oder and Neisse Rivers (Goerlitz, Zaekkerick, Muskau). | The railroad viaduct over the Neisse River at Goerlitz has been under reconstruction since late September. The reconstruction of the Oder bridge near Zaekkerick and the Neisse bridge near Muskau was included in the 1953 railroad construction program. |
| 25. | Execution of railroad construction projects designed to increase the efficiency of the Soviet Zone railroad system. | Pertinent construction projects are the reconstruction of second tracks, the construction of dismantled single-track lines, the construction of connecting curves and passing sidings, the enlargement of railroad stations, and the construction of new railroad lines. The Soviet Zone railroad construction program is dominated by military and political view points. |

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<u>Indications</u>	<u>Comment</u>
26. Construction of loading ramps at railroad stations.	Improvement of loading facilities for military purposes.
27. Enlargement of the park of operational freight cars.	Observations indicated that priority was given to heavy-duty flatcars and railroad tank cars. A total of 1,600 heavy-duty flatcars with a load capacity of 80 tons are scheduled to be built in 1952. The present monthly output is 150 cars. Each of these cars can be loaded with two tanks.
28. Enlargement and renewal of the park of locomotives.	No new locomotives have been built for the Soviet Zone railroad system since the end of the war. Most of the locomotives available are over-age. Sustained railroad operations as required in war time will necessitate the manufacture of new locomotives.
29. Establishment of ties and rails dumps along main railroad lines.	Such dumps will be required for a speedy repair of war damages.
30. Establishment of reserves of permanent way construction materials such as rails, ties, switches, and small fittings.	No adequate reserves of these materials are available.
31. Storage of bridge construction material near important railroad bridges.	These reserves will be required for the speedy repair of damages effected by bombing or sabotage acts. No such reserves are available at present.
32. A storage of planks at railroad bridges.	Such planks are required to make railroad bridges suitable for road traffic. No such measures have been taken to date.

II. SupplyShort-term preparations

<u>Indications</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1. Change in the allocation of fuels. Considerable reduction of export and reparations deliveries. Increased AAA protection for hydrogenation and gasoline plants.	Increased quantities of fuel will be allocated to the Soviet Armed Forces.
2. Organization of special supply units which are not in existence at present. Assignment of additional personnel to existing supply units.	This refers to special supply trains, road construction battalions, traffic control units and forwarding points.
3. Assembly of increased numbers of freight cars at major supply installations and increased loading activities there.	The volume of supply traffic will increase with the beginning of aggressive operations.

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IndicationsComment

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| 4. Camouflage and security measures taken at major supply installations. | Establishment of AAA protection, tightening of security measures. |
| 5. Assembly of hospital trains and of loaded supply trains. | Establishment of mobile supply reserves. |
| 6. Preventive vaccination of soldiers. | It is unknown whether the Soviets will take such sanitary measures. |
| 7. Issuance of increased quantities of fuel. | |
| 8. Unusual increase in the volume of supply traffic from the USSR to Germany. | |

Long-term preparations.

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| 9. Enlargement of existing supply depots or construction of new dumps near the zonal boundary. | The establishment of a supply base near the zonal boundary will be required prior to the beginning of aggressive operations. |
| 10. The establishment of large fuel reserves. | Large fuel dumps will be established near the zonal boundary. |
| 11. Dispersal of existing supply installations in order to reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks. | These measures will also involve protective concealment, air defense and counter espionage activities. |
| 12. Increased supply shipments to troop units and to supply installations near the zonal boundary. Increase of stocks kept at supply installations. | Supply goods required for sustained military operations will have to be moved to assembly areas. |
| 13. Shipments of chemical warfare agents and rocket weapons including propelling agents and special ammunition. | No such stocks are available in the Soviet Zone of Germany. |

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